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Foreword: Argument Overview 
This thesis argues that the advance directive for euthanasia (ADE) is morally permissible, 
and that it is morally obligatory to respect and fulfill the ADE in the clinical setting. 
This thesis was inspired by a practical dilemma: in many jurisdictions, only patients of 
sound mind (designated compos mentis) have access to physician-assisted euthanasia. It is not like 
physician-assisted suicide, wherein the patient may be prescribed a killing pill and take it at a later 
date. In current practice, because physician-assisted euthanasia is administered by a medical 
professional, the patient must be euthanized while she is of sound mind, typically not long after 
consent to the procedure. 
When a patient receives a dementia diagnosis, then, she is in an unusual position with two 
unfavorable options. Assuming that she wants to be euthanized, she can choose to die while 
compos mentis, thus securing control over her future, at the potential price of years of living with 
a sound mind. Alternatively, she can wait it out, trying to see how closely she can toe the line of 
being non-compos mentis before it is too late, at the risk of rapid and unexpected decline. If she 
were to fail this gamble, she would experience all the harms she fears: among them, indignity, loss 
of control over her body, and emotional burden on her loved ones. 
With an ADE, the patient neither fears her future nor risks harm to herself and loved ones. 
She is able to live out the full extent of her compos mentis years, and have control over the fate of 
her living remains, the body containing the demented version of herself. 
Chapter I opens with an overarching view of the hopelessness, indignity, and fears 
dementia patients experience. Its purpose is to show that there is demand for the ADE, and that a 
properly-applied ADE will be well-received.  In the course of this, I use the case of Gillian 
3 
 
Bennet’s suicide to illustrate public desire for right-to-die procedures. I also state the practical 
benefits of the ADE and explain the procedure of an ADE. I supplement this with potential 
concerns for the execution of an ADE, and first introduce the idea of a clinical ADE taskforce. 
Chapter II is about “Margo, the Happy Sufferer.” This chapter introduces a key 
philosophical conflict of the ADE: what do we do when the non-compos mentis patient refuses the 
conditions of the ADE? Chapter II forms a thought experiment based on the real-life case of a 
woman named Margo—a woman who requested life-ending procedures in case of full descent into 
dementia, but who exhibited signs of emotional fulfillment once fully demented. My thought 
experiment asks who makes the final judgment call—“Margo 1” in her past compos mentis form, 
or “Margo 2” in her current non-compos mentis state? To determine this, I raise three key 
questions. (1.) Is Margo the same person once she is fully demented? (2.) If they are different, can 
Margo 1 call for Margo 2’s death? (3.) If they are the same person, can past Margo call for current 
Margo’s death anyway? At this point in the paper, I have not gone into the complexities of my 
position, as I will soon argue that Margo is a different person after her full dementia diagnosis, 
that Margo 1 has effectively died, and that Margo 1 still maintains rights over the fate of the body 
she knew while alive. 
The purpose of Chapter III is to answer the three questions raised in Chapter II. These 
questions enable us to disentangle the complex tensions of Margo’s dilemma. We are setting the 
groundwork so that we may argue that Margo 1 and 2 are different people, that Margo 2 is not a 
person, and that Margo 1 still maintains the ability to determine the fate of the body Margo 2 
inhabits. However, because each question in Chapter III has multiple responses, the argument 
spiderwebs. The positions explained in Chapter III are as follows: 
Question 1: Is Margo the same being before and after a full dementia diagnosis? 
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- Answer 1: Margo 1 and Margo 2 are different, and Margo 2 is a person. 
- Answer 2: Margo is the same person before and after a full dementia diagnosis. 
- Answer 3: Margo 1 and Margo 2 are different, and Margo 2 is not a person. 
Question 2: Assuming they are different people, should Margo 1 be able to kill Margo 2? 
(In sum, is this not murder?) 
- Answer 1: Yes, it is murder. (Margo 2 is a person.) (Aligns with Question 1, Answer 1.) 
- Answer 2: No, it is not murder. Margo 2 is not a person, and Margo 1 has a substantial 
enough claim to justify Margo 2’s death. (Aligns with Question 1, Answer 3.) 
- Other potential responses: Margo 2 is not a person but should not be killed. (One might 
appeal to animal rights argumentation for the rights of less rational beings.) 
Question 3: Assuming that Margo is the same person before and after a full dementia 
diagnosis, should “past Margo” call for Margo’s death, even if “present Margo” objects? (All 
arguments under Question 3 are in line with Question 1, Answer 2.) 
- Answer 1: Yes, because Margo’s critical interests persist. (Full Dworkinian argument.) Her 
past self is like a parent determining what is right for the child, her present self. 
- Answer 2: No, Margo has present interests that have validity. 
- Other potential responses: Yes, on the basis of contracts (legal argument); it depends on 
her family’s call (the “social circle” argument); no, this is suicide (religious argument). 
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Our argument only holds that Margo 1 and 2 are different, that Margo 2 is not a person, 
and that Margo 1 has substantial claim to determine the fate of the body she has always known. 
We argue this in Chapter IV. 
Chapter IV is where the bulk of the argumentation occurs. After the groundwork of the 
dilemma is set, its claims proceed roughly as follows: 1) the demented patient (referred to in the 
paper as “Margo 1,” to indicate the patient’s initial state) dies after the full onset of dementia, 2) 
the being that remains in that body (“Margo 2”) is a non-person, 3) Margo 1 has certain claims 
over her living remains, 4) Margo 1 will be harmed if those claims are jeopardized, and 5) medical 
practitioners are obligated to abide by the ADE (as argued in Chapter V). 
Chapter IV argues for the ADE from the ground up. It establishes what happens to Margo 
in dementia, what claims she possesses and why, and why these claims must be respected with an 
ADE. The first step is establishing that Margo 1 dies. The second step is defining Margo 2 as a 
non-person. The third step is determining Margo 1’s claims over her living remains. The fourth 
step is examining the harms done unto Margo 1 if those claims are defied. The fifth step is 
justifying the practical obligations of the medical practitioners. 
We reject the idea of death as a total loss of brain activity. However, we are not dualists, 
and believe that the loss of self (which, we will argue, constitutes death) is based in biological 
function and the physical capacity of the brain. Margo dies because her brain can no longer 
rationalize, acknowledge her interests, or identify with Margo’s narrative. However, this does not 
require full neural failure. 
Neural function, as it is currently observable, we argue, cannot delineate identity, 
personhood, or full consciousness. This is why we involve Furberg, who mentions a biological 
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idea of personhood—that because Margo is physically there with working neurons, she is a person. 
We rebut this, saying that without any rationality, continuity of memory, or sense of life narrative 
and the interests that defined it, the being inside Margo’s body is like being a lesser-order animal, 
with little moral weight. 
To define Margo’s identity, we draw from DeGrazia, Schechtman, Christman, and Parfit. 
DeGrazia argues that psychological unity is dependent on one’s stakes in continuing to exist, as 
well as one’s capacity for consciousness and action. Schechtman proposes the concept of narrative 
identity, which she identifies as “patterns of identification, values, and a sense of self.” Christman 
claims that unified personhood requires self-acknowledgment of a consistent character at the 
center of one’s life. Parfit argues that identities can splinter based on one’s beliefs, desires, and 
motivations. 
Our definition of an identity is thus “a conscious, rational, and autonomous sense of an 
individual life narrative, with an acknowledgement of one’s stakes, values, and quality of life, in 
a manner constituting a unified and consistent character” (35). 
To argue that Margo 2 is a non-person, we draw from Ott and Kuhse (whose argument 
relies on Singer). Ott argues that the personhood of the individual is reliant on the “mental person,” 
not on the physical constitution of the body. This means that if the person loses rationality, they 
lose personhood. Kuhse argues that Margo 2 is not a person because she lacks “strong 
psychological continuity,” and that Margo 2 is not the author of the advance directive. 
Nevertheless, Kuhse says, Margo 1 has legitimate claim to her “living remains” (the body Margo 
2 inhabits) because she has “surviving interests,” which are stronger than the fleeting desires of a 
non-person. Kuhse involves Singer’s animal rights argumentation, to claim that much like an 
animal, Margo 2 has some moral weight; but, she says, much like an animal, the demented patient 
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has no vested interest in continued existence. Kuhse’s resounding claim is that while Margo 2 has 
some interests, they are less weighty than Margo 1’s, and so Margo 2 can be killed as long as it is 
humane and without unnecessary suffering. 
Kuhse’s assertion of Margo’s claims leads to the next step of our argumentation. If Margo 
1 has “surviving interests” with more moral weight than Margo 2’s fleeting interests, then we must 
show that these claims exist after her death. Persad argues that by virtue of having lived in her 
body, Margo 1 maintains a historical right to bodily autonomy. Furthermore, Persad argues that 
this historical right is posthumous, such that it exists though Margo 1 is dead. He states that because 
she lived her life in this vessel, she has the most significant claim to its wellbeing. We synthesize 
Persad’s argument with Kuhse’s surviving interests theory and Dworkinian critical interest theory1 
to argue that the historical claim to one’s body is a fundamental critical interest. By virtue of Margo 
1 writing an advance directive at all, she expresses a clear critical interest for her historical bodily 
rights. We also utilize Woien’s “now-for-then” desire theory. She claims that Margo 1 expresses 
“now-for-then desires” in an ADE, meaning that her desires were well-informed, autonomous, and 
constructed to be implemented “now” for her best interests “then.” Woien contrasts this with 
Margo 2’s temporary “now-for-now” desires, which, she says, must be disregarded in favor of 
Margo 1’s autonomous and informed desires. 
 
1 We use Ott to extricate Dworkin’s critical interest theory from the rest of his argumentation. Ott argues that 
Dworkin’s claim that the demented patient is one person (that Margo 1 and Margo 2 are not different people) is not 
substantiated. My assertion is that if we acknowledge this hole in his theory, every step of his argumentation could 
just as well be used to support our theory of a splintered identity with posthumous critical interests. The key 
difference is just that he believes they are one person, and we believe they are two. But if we are able to breach that 
barrier of claims—as we attempt to do—with posthumous rights, then our theories are compatible. 
It is also worth addressing that Dworkin is not a consequentialist. Though this paper is consequentialist in nature, it 
is strongly founded in conceptions of moral claims and duties. The difference is that we believe these claims and 
duties are valid insofar as they bottom out in benefits or harms (as discussed in Chapters IV and V). So while we do 
not agree with every argument of every philosopher mentioned in this paper, we utilize arguments that fit into this 
framework of rule utilitarianism. 
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Persad’s argument that Margo 1 has posthumous claims may seem odd, but he is not 
without company. Feinberg and Pitcher also argue that claims and harms can breach death. To 
explore how harm is done unto Margo, we use Feinberg, Nagel, Pitcher, and Luper. First, we 
describe Feinberg’s analysis of types of moral harm, to determine that if Margo 1’s ADE is 
disregarded, her interests will have been thwarted and her bodily rights will have been infringed 
upon. Nagel argues, then, that death can deprive us of desires. We mention that if death can deprive 
us of desires, then we surely can be deprived in death. Pitcher discusses the temporal confusions 
of posthumous harm, leaving Luper to more clearly and thoroughly describe how posthumous 
harm works applicable to our case. In sum, if an event endangers our interests tomorrow, it harms 
us today, because our interests currently exist. We therefore argue that if Margo 1’s critical interest 
over bodily autonomy is endangered after her narrative death (if the doctor disrespects the ADE), 
then she is harmed posthumously. 
To argue for the obligation of medical practitioners to maximize benefits for Margo, we 
draw on Beauchamp and Childress’s four principles of bioethics (beneficence, non-maleficence, 
autonomy, and justice). We argue that respecting the ADE enhances benefits for Margo 1, secures 
her autonomy over her body, and prevents the injustice of the thwarting of her critical interests. In 
Chapter V, we expound on the practical side of the ADE, including concerns for doctor 
participation and wellbeing, mechanisms needed for the proper implementation of the ADE 
(including clinical frameworks and political culture), and issues of access. We conclude that while 
the ADE prevents posthumous harm to Margo, protects her critical interests, and gives her the 




Chapter I. An Introduction to Advance Directives for Euthanasia 
Without a planet-wide healthcare revolution, by the year 2050, over 131.5 million people 
worldwide will have dementia.2 Despite recent revelations within the medical research community 
regarding prospective treatments for dementia, specifically Alzheimer’s Disease, there is currently 
no cure. Accordingly, the high degree of suffering conferred by the disease compels us to discuss 
means of mitigating patients’ pain. 
To conceptualize the harms of the disease, we must understand its physical and 
psychological impacts, which transcend loss of memory, function, and cognition. Patients 
“may…die earlier from dementia-related health problems such as pneumonia and intake problems 
or comorbid disease…[with] means or medians of [survival] between about 3 and 10 years.”3 As 
for the psychological harms, in Legal Medicine, Cipriani and Di Fiorino explain that patients fear 
not only loss of control, but also dependence on others, inability to report suffering, and 
institutionalization. They state, “Many people fear dementia and some would prefer an earlier 
death over having to progress to the final stages of Alzheimer’s disease.”4 
One theoretical solution for patients’ fears is the ADE—the advance directive for 
euthanasia. 
An advance directive allows an individual to assert control of her own future; prevents 
family members from navigating difficult ethical, emotional, and financial healthcare dilemmas; 
 
2 Cipriani, Gabriele, and Mario Di Fiorino. "Euthanasia and Other End of Life in Patients Suffering from Dementia." 
Legal Medicine 40 (2019): 54-59. Web. 
3 Cipriani, Gabriele, and Mario Di Fiorino. "Euthanasia and Other End of Life in Patients Suffering from Dementia." 
Legal Medicine 40 (2019): 54-59. Web. 
4 Cipriani, Gabriele, and Mario Di Fiorino. "Euthanasia and Other End of Life in Patients Suffering from Dementia." 
Legal Medicine 40 (2019): 54-59. Web. 
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and guides healthcare professionals to act in a manner consonant with the previously compos 
mentis individual’s interests. Types of advance directives include a living will, which expresses 
the competent individual’s desires for their future treatment when incompetent, and a proxy 
directive, which appoints a competent agent to delineate medical decisions in the case of one’s 
incompetence.5 However, the advance directive can also be a straightforward contractual 
expression of the individual’s desires in a specific scenario, including a case of post-dementia 
diagnosis incompetence. 
Via an advance directive for euthanasia (ADE), a compos mentis individual would be able 
to state her desire to be killed in the case of her becoming non-compos mentis. In other words, the 
individual could be able to call for the physical death of her post-dementia diagnosis state, for 
reasons that might include but might not be limited to dignity, personal identity, and notions of 
familial burden. 
With this theoretical advance directive, a compos mentis patient diagnosed with dementia 
and/or Alzheimer’s would delineate a brightline for the time of their physician-assisted euthanasia. 
This brightline would be the threshold of the mental faculties with which they would like to live. 
For example, one might ask that they be euthanized when they can no longer remember the names 
of their children. Or the line may be more complex, involving a series of questions, a logic puzzle, 
or a passcode. Most vitally, the patient would have full autonomy over this brightline. 
Unfortunately, the theoretical ADE is not legal in the United States. In common practice, 
the advance directive for euthanasia is barred, and to access physician-assisted suicide, patients 
 
5 Kuhse, Helga. "Some Reflections on the Problem of Advance Directives, Personhood, and Personal Identity." 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 9.4 (1999): 347-364. Web. 
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must be fully compos mentis and diagnosed with a fatal illness (with death anticipated in the next 
six months or earlier). A dementia diagnosis falls into a gray area: it is associated with fatal 
conditions, but typically takes longer than six months to reach a critical point; and it is impossible 
for the patient to take the medication at the exact tipping point of being non-compos mentis, 
because the line is not black-and-white. By the time she reaches the point at which she wanted to 
terminate her life—the point at which she is non-compos mentis—she will not have the mental 
awareness nor the legal ability to articulate this desire. It is self-defeating: to prevent herself from 
living as a non-compos mentis being, the compos mentis person must kill herself before it is too 
late. Yet she will often not be in a fatal position until she is deeply demented, and so she cannot 
access physician-assisted suicide. The case law simply does not accommodate her trials as a 
demented individual. Instead of allowing her to live her compos mentis life to its fullest, the law’s 
strictures can only drive her to suicide. 
To understand what is at stake for the dementia patient, consider the case of Gillian 
Bennett, author of Dead at Noon, a website chronicling Bennett’s descent into dementia.6 Bennett 
programmed the website to release at the time of her suicide, to which she was driven in the 
absence of options for euthanasia given her increasingly non-compos mentis state. Bennett died in 
2014, before euthanasia for even the compos mentis and terminally ill was commonplace, but in 
the present context, there remains a prevailing message—a plea, really. Stories like Bennett’s ask 
us to consider euthanasia for those dementia patients who need it most: those who are already non-
compos mentis. If it is not given, the demented may opt for suicides, unbefitting in their indignity, 
unlike the metered, well-considered and counseled processes necessary for viable normalization 
of physician-assisted euthanasia. It is almost as if we add insult to injury. Furthermore, if they do 
 
6 Bennett, Gillian. “Dead at Noon.” http://www.deadatnoon.com/ 
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not opt for suicides, the issue is not rectified, as the patient is still left to crumble in a manner 
contrary to their own interests and wishes. 
Permitting advance directives for physician-assisted euthanasia dodges the ills of this 
scenario. Note its parallels to the do-not-resuscitate (DNR) order. Patients who issue a DNR may 
have the same concerns as patients who would pursue ADE: quality of life, loss of dignity, and 
inordinate suffering. Yet the patient with dementia will be forced into one of two uncomfortable 
scenarios. One, she may live out her days, gradually becoming a shell of herself, terrified, paranoid, 
and likely reduced to the functional capacity of an infant before suffering a slow and painful death. 
Or, two, she may lose years of her life, choosing to die before she is non-compos mentis. The latter 
is an option increasingly embraced by Americans in eight American jurisdictions (seven states and 
Washington, D.C.), which have legalized euthanasia for the terminally ill and suffering.7 The 
catch-22 is that the same strictures from physician-assisted suicide apply: the dementia patient 
must consent to euthanasia in real time. 
While societally we are quick to honor the wishes of the dying in DNR cases, we are 
hesitant to fulfill the wishes of the living in dementia cases. Again, there is a pervasive irony. Both 
suffer the same concerns for quality of life, dignity, and the rest. Yet because death is inflicted in 
the case of a dementia patient with an advance directive and merely allowed for a patient with a 
DNR order, there is a sense of culpability on behalf of the medical professional which damns the 
dementia patient. It seems to be a distinction based in killing versus letting die. While I could tout 
my utilitarian ideals and argue that it is silly to make such a distinction, it won’t change the fact 
 
7 Roehr, Bob. "Assisted Dying in US and Canada: Controversy Subsides after Legalisation." BMJ: British Medical 
Journal (Online) 360 (2018): K503. Web. 
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that some medical professionals may be reluctant to embrace ADE. Indeed, if this were not the 
case, the present conversation would not be so prominent in medical ethics today. 
It is not difficult to see why there would be fears associated with the ADE. Unlike 
physician-assisted suicide, euthanasia is physician-administered, not just physician-prescribed. 
Also, the non-compos mentis individual may very well protest the ADE, as they are by definition 
no longer of sound mind. What, then, is in the patient’s best interest? We will address these 
concerns in the final chapter of this thesis, which discusses practical considerations and 
reservations for the ADE. These concerns also include the creation and enforcement of the 
brightline for euthanasia’s administration; the prevention of abuse of the ADE (by family 
members, medical practitioners, mentally ill patients, and the law); and disadvantaged populations’ 
access to the mechanisms necessary for the ADE’s ethical implementation. 
The crux of the ADE is that, with it, we avoid unnecessary suffering and indignity, save 
years of the patient’s life, and preserve her autonomy to end her life in a manner consonant with 
her ideals. We advocate that the compos mentis individual has the right to opt to be euthanized in 
the advanced stages of dementia, such that she can enjoy the full capacity of her remaining years. 
We will recommend safeguards to this method, including a taskforce of professionals enlisted to 
ensure that the patient’s best interests are maximized.  
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Chapter II. Margo, the Happy Sufferer 
There is a primary obstacle to the implementation of ADE, an obstacle that will constitute 
the meat of the thesis. As a narrative, it has immense illustrative power, and will allow us to 
highlight crucial ethical entanglements at the core of the ADE. 
In short: what do we do when the demented patient’s desires conflict with her pre-dementia 
self? At surface level, it seems simple. However, the problem complicates itself quickly. We’ll 
begin with the bird’s eye view. 
One prominent objection to the ADE notes the individual’s inability to foretell his 
demented version’s options in life, feelings toward death, conceptions of personal identity, or 
medical circumstances. Kuhse states that objectors “hold that advance directives should, in some 
circumstances, be overridden. If it is in an incompetent patient’s interests to live, [objectors to 
post-diagnosis euthanasia believe] he or she should not be made to die simply because the formerly 
competent person executed an advance directive.”8 Yet proponents of post-diagnosis ADE would 
emphasize the will of the compos mentis individual, regardless of the will of the current non-
compos mentis patient. 
There are multiple ways of viewing this compos mentis predecessor and non-compos 
mentis successor—Are they the same person? Are they different people? Is the second individual 
a person at all?—but the thrust of the clash is that some value the interests of the non-compos 
mentis dementia patient, while others would say, simply put, that a good book cannot end on a bad 
 
8 Kuhse, Helga. "Some Reflections on the Problem of Advance Directives, Personhood, and Personal Identity." 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 9.4 (1999): 347-364. Web. 
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chapter. Moreover, a good book cannot end on a deteriorating chapter lacking narrative, higher 
consciousness, and even its most basic daily functions. 
The latter analogy, however, is a contentious one. While some might be more than ready 
to accept the innate harms of dementia prima facie, others may claim that dementia is not 
intrinsically detrimental to quality of life. In other words, because of dementia, not in spite of it, 
one might experience increased contentedness. Take, for example, Andrew Firlik’s example of the 
happy sufferer Margo.9 
In 1991, in the Journal of American Medicine, medical student Andrew Firlik now-
famously chronicled his experience with a patient during a gerontology course. Margo’s life was 
a charmed one. Although she did not read mystery books in a linear manner, she enjoyed them. 
Although she did not know Firlik’s name, she was happy to see him. And although she painted the 
same picture and listened to the same song every day, she loved the arts. Her mental degeneration 
led her to a state of bliss, inspiring both awe in Firlik and an inquiry as to her identity. He asks, 
“Who is Margo?” 10 
Andrew Firlik describes Margo as such: “[D]espite her illness, or maybe somehow because 
of it, Margo is undeniably one of the happiest people I have ever known.”11 Yet while compos 
mentis, Margo articulated her desire of the rejection of treatment should her dementia-ridden self 
contract treatable illnesses. However, once stricken with pneumonia, she (non-compos mentis 
Margo) desires treatment. What is a physician to say when a woman sits before him, requesting 
treatment, while a piece of paper orders him to deny her? 
 
9 Firlik, Andrew D. 1991. Margo’s Logo. Journal of the American Medical Association 9: 201. 
10 Firlik, Andrew D. 1991. Margo’s Logo. Journal of the American Medical Association 9: 201. 
11 Firlik, Andrew D. 1991. Margo’s Logo. Journal of the American Medical Association 9: 201. 
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And now the problem is emotionally complicated by Firlik’s reluctance to condemn a 
happy person to death based on the desires of an entity who, in the loss of Margo’s mental faculties, 
is no longer physically present. 
Helga Kuhse offers the following thought experiment: 
“Let us suppose that years ago, Margo was a philosophy professor who relished complex 
mental activities. Let us also suppose that Margo, while fully competent, executed an advance 
directive. Adequately informed, she knows that dementia affects different people differently, 
leaving some happy and some distressed. She makes it quite clear that even if she were to be 
experiencing no visible distress and were seemingly ‘pleasantly demented,’ she would wish to be 
allowed to die if and when the opportunity were to present itself. Margo, now demented, 
contracts pneumonia. This is likely to be fatal, unless Margo were prescribed a course of 
antibiotics. Should Margo be treated or not?”12 
Of course, the central tension in the thought experiment is the concern for the current, “pleasantly 
demented” individual in light of the compos mentis individual’s advance directive, though we are 
not to presuppose that these individuals are necessarily different people. From Kuhse’s 
experiment, we are left to question what the non-compos mentis Margo wants, and whether this 
should matter. 
 A notable distinction between Margo’s situation and the situation of someone who would 
request an ADE is that Margo requested the withholding of nutrition. This is in practice not the 
same as the ADE, as one may intuit that a doctor may be more comfortable withholding nutrition 
but not administering a lethal drug cocktail. As previously mentioned, this difference rests in the 
distinction between killing versus letting die. However, for the purpose of this thesis, we will use 
Margo’s case as a template for someone in exactly the same situation, but who utilized a theoretical 
ADE instead of the withholding of nutrition. The reason for this is that Margo’s case bears exactly 
 
12 Kuhse, Helga. "Some Reflections on the Problem of Advance Directives, Personhood, and Personal Identity." 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 9.4 (1999): 347-364. Web. 
17 
 
the same tensions in the areas of interest to us—identity, death of the self, and the claims a compos 
mentis person has over the life of their non-compos mentis form. These are present in Margo’s 
case exactly as they are in the case of someone requesting an ADE. In both, compos mentis Margo 
wrote that non-compos mentis Margo will die, and non-compos mentis Margo does not agree. The 
killing versus letting die distinction is not relevant here, because we are not going to focus on the 
practicalities of the situation until the thesis’ final chapter. Accordingly, we will use Margo’s case 
as a form of extended thought experiment, and envision a parallel case involving ADE instead of 
withheld nutrition. For shorthand, we will still use the name Margo. 
When wrestling with the philosophical implications of Margo’s case, the bioethicist is 
confronted with three essential questions, each with its own ensuing complications. 
One: is Margo the same being pre- and post-diagnosis? We use the word being because 
one should not yet assume the personhood of the post-diagnosis individual, if distinct from the 
pre-dementia individual. Wrapped within this question is the exploration of what constitutes 
personhood, and whether advanced dementia can lead to the death of personhood. Overarchingly, 
Margo’s potential loss of self is a vital inquiry because to apply the ADE to the post-diagnosis 
individual, the pre- and post-diagnosis Margos must fall within one of the ensuing categories. 1) 
The pre- and post-diagnosis Margos must be the same person regardless of mental deterioration, 
with deference given to Margo’s compos mentis decision, as she possesses jurisdiction over 
herself. 2) They must be distinct persons, but with deference given to the pre-dementia individual 
for reasons that may include historical bodily rights, weighed interests, or notions of posthumous 
harm. 3) They must be distinct, with the second “Margo” (heretofore Margo 2) lacking personhood 
insofar as she is devoid of some to-be-delineated qualification such as rationality or consciousness, 
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assuming her interests are less important than Margo 1’s and/or that Margo 1 bears jurisdiction 
over the body. 
Of course, one could discount this trichotomy altogether and claim that the doctor must act 
in Margo’s best interest at the advice of her family; but then, this only pushes the question back, 
as we are forced to ask which best interests are Margo’s—her expressed compos mentis desires, 
or the basic desires of Margo 2, which may or may not be Margo? For the doctor and family to act 
ethically, they must have a sense of whose wishes they are respecting and whose wishes they are 
sacrificing. At root, this first question is about allocating and weighing interests. Determining 
whether Margo 1 and Margo 2 are the same allows us to question Margo 1’s jurisdiction over the 
fate of Margo 2, which is complex even if they are the same person. As previously stated, one 
could object to the advance directive on the mere basis of failed foresight; I am in my twenties, for 
example, and have no conception of my desires in my eighties. Regardless, this first question leads 
us to examine the status of Margo 1 at the time of the advance directive’s fulfillment—for if she 
is not present, one might argue, her personhood has died. The latter in turn contributes to the 
complexities of the advance directive. 
Two: if Margo 1 and Margo 2 are distinct, should Margo 1 be permitted to call for Margo 
2’s death? Intuitively, the answer to this is reliant on three factors, which are the personhood of 
Margo 2, the interests of Margo 1 versus Margo 2, and Margo 1’s rights over the body Margo 2 
inhabits. Once more, the notion of death of personhood versus change is vital to this distinction, 
and this will be duly examined. We are reminded of Judith Jarvis Thomson’s “A Defense of 
Abortion.” Thomson describes a scenario in which the reader has been kidnapped and plugged up 
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to a world-famous violinist as a form of life support.13 The reader may refuse and walk away, 
leaving the violinist to die, or the reader may stay at his own detriment, but only temporarily. 
Surely it is morally praiseworthy to stay, but not morally obligatory. Though Thomson compares 
this to the case of an unwanted pregnancy, the upshot is the same. As she puts it, “This body is my 
body!”14 If Margo 1 and Margo 2 are separate people, why must Margo 1 tolerate this houseguest 
inside of the body she has always known—the body that bore her children, married her spouse, 
and signed her legal documentation? Even if one argues that Margo 2 has claim to the body due to 
her present existence within it, does Margo 1 still have any sort of claim to the body that had 
always been hers, and does this claim outweigh Margo 2’s? 
Three: if not two distinct beings, should Margo be allowed to call for her own death, and 
should doctors be obligated to obey her compos mentis wishes despite her present pleas to stay 
alive? This question is seemingly simpler, but is in actuality not without its complications. The 
contentions in this scenario are the legitimacy of an advance directive over time, the right of the 
medical practitioner or family member to intervene on the patient’s behalf, and the patient’s right 
to potentially withdraw consent due to previous lack of foresight. 
In the following chapter, we will explore responses to each of these questions, paring up 




13 Thomson, Judith J. A Defense of Abortion. New York, N.Y: Association for the Study of Abortion, 1971. Print. 
14 Thomson, Judith J. A Defense of Abortion. New York, N.Y: Association for the Study of Abortion, 1971. Print. 
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Chapter III. Three Essential Inquiries: Defining the Personhood and Rights of Margo 
Inquiry I. Continuity of Identity and the Self 
Our foremost inquiry concerns the identity of Margo. Essentially, is she the same being 
before and after dementia? If not, is the post-diagnosis individual a person? 
Before we go about the philosophical answer to these questions, it is appropriate to address 
the purely medical aspect of the inquiry. For example, one’s gut reaction is likely to say, Hold on. 
Dementia is not a hard line. No matter how one goes about it, dementia is gradual. By that vein 
of logic, it seems silly to say ‘before’ and ‘after’ dementia. But for our purposes, the point is moot, 
as we will address only certified late-stage dementia, focusing on Alzheimer’s. If we were to deal 
with early stages of dementia and merely give the patient license to say which stage of dementia 
is too much, then that sliding scale might very well give into a slippery slope, and advance 
directives could have nearly fully functional adults signing for early deaths—a type of euthanasia 
which conjures a different sort of debate entirely. 
This said, the initiation of an advance directive in this case is very much dependent on the 
evaluation of the depth of one’s descent into dementia. Is there a specific bar the patient must pass 
to be too far gone? Is it a series of questions to be completed by the dementia patient, previously 
written by the patient’s compos mentis form? Is dementia purely at the hands of the doctor to 
diagnose? We will, as stated, detail more practical considerations in the final chapter. 
In any case, acknowledging that Margo’s dementia is so progressed that she has little 
conception of herself, her former life, or her daily functions, we are able to chalk out two entities, 
Margo 1 and Margo 2, be they the same person or not. For example, I was Isabella at age five, and 
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I am Isabella at age twenty-two, and universe-willing, I will be Isabella at age forty; and though 
we are the same, I have changed greatly, and may delineate Isabellas 1, 2, and 3 respectively. 
Because I am compos mentis at twenty-two, if I were to get married now, then at age forty, even 
if I had chronic amnesia, I would still be married: my legal identity would have remained intact, 
though I refer to forty-year-old Isabella as Isabella 3, and twenty-two-year-old Isabella as Isabella 
2. Therefore, when we inquire as to whether Margo 1 and Margo 2 are the same, we do not ask 
whether they have the same legal attachments such as marriages, property, or debt, but rather 
whether they have a sense of continuity in self. Whether Margo 2 has the same identity as Margo 
1 will have vast implications for the power of the advance directive. So we will carve out this one 
corner of the issue, and try to address it succinctly. 
Theory 1. Margo 1 and 2 Are Different Beings 
DeGrazia links psychological unity to rational egoism, one’s “stake in continuing to 
exist.”15 His theory of unity agrees with Marya Schechtman, who argues that “a distinct sense of 
‘identity’ is more closely tied to our patterns of identification, values, and sense of self: narrative 
identity.”16 The latter includes one’s sense of self, the story of one’s life, and is important because 
of its prominence in one’s quality of life and in its connection to one’s concern over one’s future. 
His “biological theory” then suggests a cohesive narrative identity as a brightline by which to 
evaluate the sameness or splintering of Margo over time. Additionally, DeGrazia adds, “[M]ost of 
us value not mere survival—or numerical identity—but survival with the capacities for 
consciousness and action.”17 This capacity allows us to plan for our futures. In other words, if 
 
15 DeGrazia, David. "Identity, Killing, and the Boundaries of Our Existence." Philosophy & Public Affairs 31.4 
(2003): 413-42. Web. 
16 Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996. 
17 DeGrazia, David. "Identity, Killing, and the Boundaries of Our Existence." Philosophy & Public Affairs 31.4 
(2003): 413-42. Web. 
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Margo 1’s valuation of consciousness, action, and control over her future compelled her to write 
an advance directive, then Margo 1 intended to preserve her own narrative. She meant to have 
control over how her book ended. And if Margo 2 lacks Margo 1’s sense of self, story of her life, 
and concern for her preservation of the overall narrative (so to speak), then her narrative identity 
has changed, and she ceases to be the same person. As Christman corroborates, “What is required 
for unified personhood is that the subject of that life be a reflecting subject whose self-
interpretations make enough sense of those events that a consistent character can be seen at their 
center.”18 Margo 1, the austere philosopher, and Margo 2, drawer of concentric pastel circles, are 
not a consistent character. 
In Reasons and Persons, Parfit argues that an individual shifts through different selves as 
her beliefs, desires, and motivations evolve, potentially constituting a splintering of identity.19 
Perhaps this notion of two distinct Margos, one might argue, is far-fetched. One could say that, 
yes, Margo 2 lacks Margo 1’s personality and motivations, but perhaps this is only because Margo 
1 could not know that dementia spelled out a happy ending. Perhaps Margo 2 is a wiser Margo. 
Nevertheless, applying DeGrazia’s theory to Parfit’s notion of a splintered identity, one might just 
rebut that Margo 2’s complete obliviousness to her personal history, preexisting traits, and lifelong 
relationships constitutes a significant change in the core pillars of identity, thus producing a new 
“self.” In Margo’s case, the latter would be a product not of learned happiness but of obliviousness, 
emergent from mental deterioration. 
Theory 2. Margo 1 and 2 Are the Same Person 
 
18 Christman, John. "Narrative Unity as a Condition of Personhood." Metaphilosophy 35.5 (2004): 695-713. Web. 
19 Parfit, Derek. Reasons and Persons. Oxford [Oxfordshire: Clarendon Press, 1987. 
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In Life’s Dominion, Dworkin argues that the life of a person is defined by critical 
interests.20 These are the binding goals and desires which give one’s story coherence and meaning. 
For example, one’s desire to be a good father may well constitute a critical interest, purposeful or 
unwitting. He states that “even people whose lives feel unplanned are nevertheless often guided 
by a sense of the general style of life they think appropriate, of what choices strike them as not 
only good at the moment but in character for them.”21 Dworkin acknowledges the importance of 
the method of one’s death to one’s life, constituting a critical rather than one of the less poignant 
“experiential interests,” which are the less meaningful desires ubiquitous to all life, such as the 
consumption of good food—important, but not critical.22 Critical interests are the building blocks 
of a person’s truest desires, their core identity, and though Margo has lost the ability to understand 
anything but basic experiential interests, Dworkin argues, this does not mean her critical interests 
should not be respected. 
Dworkin therefore does not argue for a splintering of the individual’s identity, but rather 
for a loss of the ability to understand the narrative arc of one’s life. Much like a parent counseling 
a child, the competent Margo 1 stated her desires for her own self, the incompetent Margo 2, and 
to override Margo 1 would be to ignore her critical interests, interfere with her autonomy over 
herself, and engage in medical paternalism. If we are to follow the logic of Life’s Dominion, then 
obeying the advance directive is not only morally praiseworthy but morally obligatory, as Margo 
 
20 Dworkin, Ronald. Life's Dominion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom. New 
York: Vintage Books, 1994. Print. 
21 Dworkin, Ronald. Life's Dominion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom. New 
York: Vintage Books, 1994. Print. 
22 Dworkin, Ronald. Life's Dominion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom. New 
York: Vintage Books, 1994. Print. 
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1 and Margo 2 are much the same person, and in penning the ADE, Margo is only making decisions 
that uphold her lifelong critical interests. 
Theory 3. Margo 1 is a Person, and Margo 2 is a Different Being and a Non-Person 
Rather than argue that Margo is a different person, as DeGrazia implicates, or that she is 
the same person, as Dworkin implicates with critical interests, Kuhse argues that a patient in the 
position of Margo 2 would no longer be a person. About a competent patient, she states, “As long 
as strong psychological connections continue to exist, there is little reason to doubt that the 
executor of the advance directive and the patient are the same person.”23 But in the case of the 
Alzheimer’s patient? “Even if some psychological continuity continues to exist between the person 
at t1 and the incompetent patient at t2,” Kuhse explains, “it does not follow that the incompetent 
patient at t2 is a person.”
24 Her logic is based on the Lockean tradition of a person’s identity as a 
conscious being composed of rationality, self-consciousness, and agency over time. If Margo 2 is 
not in a position to be rational, conscious of herself, actionable, or cognizant of time, then she lacks 
the identity she once had. Kuhse argues for the division between compos mentis Margo and non-
compos mentis Margo, writing, “[I]f a severely demented patient is not a person, it follows that 
she…cannot be the same person as the author of the advance directive.”25 However, Kuhse notes 
the issue with this line of argumentation: if Margo 2 is not the writer of the advance directive and 
is enjoying her life, why would we permit a separate being’s (Margo 1’s) advance directive to sign 
away her death? Kuhse cites the argumentation of Buchanan, who claims that “living interests”—
 
23 Kuhse, Helga. "Some Reflections on the Problem of Advance Directives, Personhood, and Personal Identity." 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 9.4 (1999): 347-364. Web. 
24 Kuhse, Helga. "Some Reflections on the Problem of Advance Directives, Personhood, and Personal Identity." 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 9.4 (1999): 347-364. Web. 
25 Kuhse, Helga. "Some Reflections on the Problem of Advance Directives, Personhood, and Personal Identity." 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 9.4 (1999): 347-364. Web. 
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such as one’s loved ones, assets, and “living remains”—constitute surviving interests, which are 
morally weightier than the fleeting emotions of a non-person like Margo 2.26 Kuhse then notes 
Singer’s speciesism argumentation, and compares demented human nonpersons to non-human 
animals to draw the link that while it is wrong to inflict undue suffering upon beings like Margo 
2, it is not wrong to kill them painlessly, especially if for the benefit of a human person. She further 
explains, “Although persons and all sentient animals can experience pain, only persons can 
anticipate, and have desires about, their own future.”27 While demented patients may experience 
visceral pleasures, says Kuhse, this does not mean they have a vested interest in continued 
existence. By this line of reasoning, when the non-person’s basic enjoyments are weighed against 
the surviving interests of the advance directive’s author, it is clear that the morally weightier 
desires of compos mentis Margo 1 defeat the momentary pleasures of non-compos mentis, non-
person Margo 2. 
Note—though DeGrazia argues primarily for the separation of Margo 1 and Margo 2 as 
persons, his definition of a “person” actually supports Margo 2’s nonperson status. He states, 
“[B]oth psychological theorists (e.g., Parfit, Baker, McMahan) and their critics (e.g., Olson) use 
the term person to refer, roughly, to beings with the capacity for complex forms of consciousness 
such as self-awareness over time and the ability to plan…[or] ‘a being with the potential to develop 
complex forms of consciousness.’”28 In other words, to be a person, one must exhibit a state of 
awareness including knowledge of oneself beyond the present state and the ability to grasp 
 
26 Kuhse, Helga. "Some Reflections on the Problem of Advance Directives, Personhood, and Personal Identity." 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 9.4 (1999): 347-364. Web. 
27 Kuhse, Helga. "Some Reflections on the Problem of Advance Directives, Personhood, and Personal Identity." 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 9.4 (1999): 347-364. Web. 
28 DeGrazia, David. "Identity, Killing, and the Boundaries of Our Existence." Philosophy & Public Affairs 31.4 
(2003): 413-42. Web. 
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concepts of the future while anticipating intended actions. If this is not the case, then one must 
have the potential to do so. Margo 2 cannot rise to this standard of personhood. 
What this means is that DeGrazia’s narrative unity theory and Kuhse’s living interest 
theory are not mutually exclusive. Though DeGrazia’s focus is not designating Margo 2 a non-
person, it can be used in tandem with Kuhse’s argumentation. Accordingly, in Chapter IV, we will 
synthesize them in our defense of the advance directive. 
Note, too, that Dworkin’s critical interests theory does not mutually exclude conceptions 
of narrative disunity nor living interests. Though he reasons to different conclusions, the theory 
itself may be applied to our analysis of Margo; thus, in Chapter IV, we will apply Dworkin’s 
critical interests to a synthesized theory of self and personhood. 
In response to the inquiry as to the unity of Margo’s identity, we have provided three 
potential lines of thought. Even more, within those lines of thought, we have already begun to 
unravel potential answers to the second and third inquiries. We will address the remaining two 
questions in order, referring to previous analyses as appropriate. 
Inquiry II. Should Margo 1 Kill Margo 2? 
The second major issue in the case of Margo is as follows: if Margo 1 and Margo 2 are 
distinct entities, does Margo 1’s advance directive apply to Margo 2? 
One side of the argument is straightforward. No, one might argue, applying the advance 
directive would constitute murder. Along this vein of reasoning, if Margo 1 and Margo 2 are 
distinct, then Margo 1 cannot ethically kill Margo 2, regardless of whether she is a person, non-
person, or a person with limited moral standing. One might defend Margo 2’s right to life as a 
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person; one might argue for the rights of people with mental incapacities; or, if one believes Margo 
is not a person, but a lesser-order being, one might defend her right to life along the lines of animal 
rights argumentation. 
The other side of the argument is more complex. To argue that it is not murder for Margo 
1 to order the death of Margo 2 requires a convincing argument that Margo 1 has a claim to the 
body she had always known. It becomes even more complex when we consider the possible 
contemporaneous claims of Margo 2. 
Kuhse argues that it is not wrong to painlessly execute the advance directive, because the 
interests of the preexisting person outweigh the desires of the severely demented nonperson. To 
rephrase, the morally weighty interests of the compos mentis person to control the future of her 
living remains thwart any daily pleasures of nonpersons which “no longer have an interest in their 
own continued existence.”29 Thus, while Margo 2 may enjoy literature, music, and art, Kuhse 
argues that she is a nonperson due to her inability to conceptualize and have a vested interest in 
her own future. Therefore Margo 1’s advance directive would apply to Margo 2, because Margo 
1’s lifelong interests, self-fulfillment, and control over the body she has always known are more 
significant than Margo 2’s contemporaneous enjoyments.  
Ott supplements this with an analysis of “constitutional”30 concerns, arguing that a body 
only has its personhood because of the “mental person” within it, and that the mental, rational, 
autonomous person will naturally have concerns over that body, whose characteristics would be 
moot without the person inside. This establishes the connection between the mental person and 
 
29 Kuhse, Helga. "Some Reflections on the Problem of Advance Directives, Personhood, and Personal Identity." 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 9.4 (1999): 347-364. Web. 
30 Ott uses this term to refer to that which constitutes the person, not the American social contract. 
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their physical body, even after that mental person has gone, and asserts that should that occur, the 
body is bereft of personhood. Ott states that constitutional concerns are “even stronger than 
concern for another family member…. This…makes the person a better possible advocate for the 
sentient nonperson than a parent or proxy.”31 She designates the fulfillment of an advance directive 
as “autonomy-preserving,” because the previously autonomous person can act for the bodily 
organism when the second sentient nonperson (Margo 2) is in the “twilight of autonomy.”32 
In Chapter IV, we will argue that Margo 1’s interests are substantial justification for her 
advance directive for euthanasia, and that even if Margo 2 possesses claims, their significance 
pales in comparison to the claims related to Margo 1’s critical and living interests. 
Inquiry III. If There is Only Margo 1, Can She Kill Herself? 
While the latter arguments answer the posed second inquiry to Margo’s situation, we have 
not yet addressed the third hypothetical: if demented Margo is the same person as compos mentis 
Margo, is it morally justified to allow the compos mentis Margo 1 to pen an advance directive for 
her older self? Additionally, should doctors be obligated to obey her advance directive despite her 
present pleas to stay alive? 
Now, one may ask why we would bother to explore this option. Clearly, we believe that 
Margo 1 has died, or at least experienced a disruption her narrative unity. Regardless, it is 
important to explore the arguments surrounding Margo’s unified personhood, because to fully 
argue our thesis, we must give credence to the question from all angles. 
 
31 Ott, Andrea. "Personal Identity and the Moral Authority of Advance Directives." The Pluralist 4 (2009): 38-54. 
Web. 




To that end, recall Dworkin’s analysis of critical interests. This notion of critical interests 
rests in the unity of the individual over time, such that a breach of her advance directive constitutes 
violation not only of her deepest desires, but of her autonomy.33 Dworkin views Margo 1 not as 
dead, but as mentally incapacitated, unable to recall, conceptualize, and express the critical 
interests she once held so dear. Because she is incapacitated, her critical interests mandate respect 
for the advance directive. 
Ott remarks, “Dworkin’s basis for his position is grounded on a firm respect for the life as 
one whole autonomous unit, and therefore the former wishes must take precedence.”34 However, 
as prefaced, we will utilize the definition of a critical interest in an analysis grounded in splintered 
identities. (The key is to show that critical interests can survive after death. If we show that critical 
interests endure, we will not need to support a unified personal identity to argue for the advance 
directive on the basis of critical interests.) 
Dresser proposes a rebuttal to Dworkin’s view. Yes, Dresser posits, it is very well to claim 
that respecting the advance directive in turn respects the precedent autonomy of Margo; but, she 
adds, “Dworkin assumes that Margo…is the same person who issued the earlier requests to die, 
despite the drastic psychological alternation that has occurred.”35 Dworkin’s argumentation 
depends on an assumption that Margo’s personal identity remains intact, even though “substantial 
memory loss and other psychological changes may produce a new person, whose connection to 
 
33 Dworkin, Ronald. Life's Dominion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom. New 
York: Vintage Books, 1994. Print. 
34 Ott, Andrea. "Personal Identity and the Moral Authority of Advance Directives." The Pluralist 4 (2009): 38-54. 
Web. 
35 Dresser, Rebecca. "Dworkin on Dementia: Elegant Theory, Questionable Policy." The Hastings Center Report 
25.6 (1995): 32-8. Web. 
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the earlier one…could be no stronger than that between you and me.”36 Dresser’s logic suggests 
that if one disagrees with Dworkin’s “assumption,” then Margo 1’s authority over Margo 2 is 
shattered. (This is one of the reasons why we adopt and synthesize the Dworkinian view into a 
more enduring conception of interests.) 
Dworkin’s theory is one of the most commonly propagated views on advance directives, 
but is by no means ubiquitously accepted. Take, for example, the argument of Jaworska, who does 
not defer to preexisting interests of the compos mentis Margo 1 who wrote the advance directive, 
and instead argues that we should pay deference to the present individual’s (Margo 2’s) ability to 
value. Therefore, because Margo 2 is able to value her life, even in the simplest sense, her current 
wish to remain alive should be respected. Autonomous decision-making stems from values, 
Jaworska argues, and therefore a being who can value is still worthy of contemporaneous moral 
consideration.37 
It is easy to see the appeal of this theory. While it is easy to claim that one sees Margo 2 as 
a nonperson, one can imagine that a medical practitioner would struggle to look a human being in 
the eyes and euthanize them. This is not at all an attempt to claim that Jaworska’s theory of 
valuation is based in pathos. On the contrary, it is to say that no matter its philosophical nuances, 
Jaworska’s theory may be more readily accepted by a doctor, nurse, or caretaker, because it at a 
glance seems more in line with their training, which dictates immediate beneficence to the patient 
before them. Other thinkers may disagree with Jaworska and claim that to euthanize the patient is 
to disrespect her prior wishes, thereby inflicting harm; but, practically speaking, doctors and nurses 
 
36 Dresser, Rebecca. "Dworkin on Dementia: Elegant Theory, Questionable Policy." The Hastings Center Report 
25.6 (1995): 32-8. Web. 
37 Jaworska, Agnieszka. "Respecting the Margins of Agency: Alzheimer's Patients and the Capacity to Value." 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 28 (1999): 105-32. 
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might be uncomfortable with the advance directive, regardless of the philosophical implications 
of disobeying it. The practicalities of this will be discussed in Chapter V. 
 In this chapter, we have provided an overview of possible responses to the complexities 
of Margo’s identity and claims. In the following chapter, we will synthesize some of the given 
perspectives and provide a defense for the ADE based in Margo’s narrative disunity, historical 
bodily rights, and critical interests. This will culminate in the argument that if Margo’s historical 
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Chapter IV. Synthesizing Narrative Disunity, Non-Person Theory, and Critical Interests 
Section A: Death in Dementia 
To argue for Margo 1’s right to an advance directive for euthanasia, we must delineate her 
claims to her body after the onset of dementia. To delineate her claims, we must determine her 
rights to the body. To determine her rights to the body, we must determine whether Margo 1 is 
functionally dead. 
In his essay Dementia and social death, Paul Spicker explains, “Dementia is a condition in 
which the self is gradually eroded, both in a psychological and a social sense. In psychological 
terms, the loss of intellectual faculties, the loss of will and the loss of emotional control undermine 
the person's perception of the self, the self as 'I'. In social terms, people with dementia also witness 
the erosion of the self through the eyes of…the people who care for them.”38 The “social death” 
Spicker describes is significant insofar as it constitutes the shattering of narrative unity which is 
so vital to considerations of advance directives. Hence, we see the glaring issue of the advance 
directive for physician-assisted euthanasia: how can the compos mentis person, Margo 1, make 
decisions for the non-compos mentis person, Margo 2, who constitutes that “self” after the 
destruction of narrative unity, social self, and identity? 
A philosopher in line with Dworkin may dismiss the idea and state that Margo 1 is actually 
still Margo 2, and that as such, Margo 1’s interests persist. As stated, Dworkin supports the 
carrying-out of compos mentis Margo’s requests to the detriment of the desires of non-compos 
mentis Margo, but only on the basis that Margo became demented, as in, retained her identity such 
that her autonomous desires carried and her interests persisted. Dworkin did not claim that Margo 
 
38 Spicker, A. (2000). Dementia and social death. Self Agency and Society, 2(2), 88-104. 
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died and a non-person alien took over—which is, interestingly, what Dena Davis will claim in 
Section B of this chapter. 
Before we argue for Margo 2’s non-personhood, we must address the matter of the “death” 
itself. Did Margo die? From there, we will question if the body’s inhabitant is merely Margo 1 in 
new form (as in, whether she retains vestiges of the former person), or whether the destruction of 
the former identity constitutes a new person. Indeed, what are the grounds for Margo 2 existing at 
all, and what claims would this alleged person have, legally and morally? 
Thomas Nagel defines death “to mean permanent death, unsupplemented by any form of 
conscious survival.”39 This is the intuitive answer, but does not respond to our question of Margo’s 
existence. We must still ask whether what occurred constitutes death. Margo 1, to clarify, is 
permanently gone, without conscious survival insofar as her identity has eroded. Nagel’s definition 
only pushes the question back to become a matter of identity—because if Margo 1 and 2 are 
distinct people, then, yes, Margo 1 is dead, as she maintains no conscious survival. If we are to 
agree with Schechtman’s theory of narrative identity over time40, Christman’s consistent character 
theory41, or even DeGrazia’s cohesive narrative theory42, we will agree that Margo 1 is not Margo 
2. Margo 2 may be conscious, but she is not who she was before. 
To identify our own view of Margo’s identity, we will draw from DeGrazia, Schechtman, 
Christman, and Parfit, to synthesize a cohesive definition of identity and the death of the self. In 
 
39 Nagel, Thomas (1970). Death. Noûs 4 (1):73-80. 
40 Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996. 
41 Christman, John. "Narrative Unity as a Condition of Personhood." Metaphilosophy 35.5 (2004): 695-713. Web. 
42 DeGrazia, David. "Identity, Killing, and the Boundaries of Our Existence." Philosophy & Public Affairs 31.4 
(2003): 413-42. Web. 
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our view, we align categorically with the theory that not only has Margo 1 died, but she and Margo 
2 are different entities. 
DeGrazia argues that one’s stake in continuing to exist, grounded in the capacity for 
consciousness and action, constitutes the self.43 We agree that Margo 1’s conception of self is 
grounded not only in her conscious action and desire to preserve the narrative direction of her life, 
but also her valuation of this act of preservation. Seeing as Margo 1—in our hypothetical—
necessarily wrote an ADE, control over the arc of her life is a key aspect of her narrative. Margo 
2, the happy sufferer, is by definition too far gone to register these concerns, or much else other 
than baseline pleasures such as pudding and scribbling pictures. We combine this view of self with 
Schechtman’s narrative identity argument, the view that values, self-identification, a sense of one’s 
life story, and concerns for quality of life and one’s future constitute a narrative identity.44 We also 
draw from Christman’s view of unified personhood and the standard of the consistent character45, 
as well as Parfit’s notion of splintered identities.46 
Thus, we posit that an identity is defined not by current state of being, but by a conscious 
sense of an individual life narrative, along with acknowledgment of one’s stakes, values, and 
quality of life, in a manner constituting a unified and consistent character. Once this definition no 
longer holds, we have a splintered identity. Effectively, Margo 1’s identity dies. With this, we once 
 
43 DeGrazia, David. "Identity, Killing, and the Boundaries of Our Existence." Philosophy & Public Affairs 31.4 
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again quote Kuhse: “[I]f a severely demented patient is not a person, it follows that she…cannot 
be the same person as the author of the advance directive.”47 
This is not without dissent. As a rebuttal to philosophers like Schechtman and Kuhse, 
Elisabeth Furberg delineates three ethical schools of thought regarding identity in cases of advance 
directives. They are the biological, psychological, and narrative.48 Biological selves are animal, as 
in, physical continuities; psychological selves entail consistency in one’s psyche; and of the 
narrative view, she states the following: 
“In the advance directives debate, most ethicists who appeal to a narrative view of 
identity conclude that this view offers support for the authority of advance directives – even 
when there is lack of psychological continuity between the author and the later patient. Their 
argument to this affect usually builds on two distinct claims. One is, as we have seen, that (strict) 
identity (persistence) does not matter to the moral authority of advance directives. The second 
claim is that even if there is lack of psychological continuity between the author of the directive 
and the later patient, we can defend the directive’s authority by appeals to ‘surviving 
interests.’”49 
She offers three rebuttals. Firstly, she questions that identity is necessary to the moral authority of 
advance directives. Secondly, she posits that one could say psychological continuity is necessary 
for identity, while identity itself is too normative to be the foundation of the power of an advance 
directive. Finally, she says, “it could be argued that even if the author of the advance directive is 
not identical to the later dementia patient, she is at least kin to her closest relative, in which case 
her earlier preferences ought to be granted at least some authority.”50 In other words, we should 
 
47 Kuhse, Helga. "Some Reflections on the Problem of Advance Directives, Personhood, and Personal Identity." 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 9.4 (1999): 347-364. Web. 
48 Furberg, Elisabeth, 2012, “Advance Directives and Personal Identity: What is the Problem?” Journal of Medicine 
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respect Margo 1’s directive not because of her interests, but because she is like Margo 2’s closest 
relative. 
Because we utilize the narrative view of identity in this argumentation, I will respond to 
each of Furberg’s objections in turn. 
Firstly, identity is necessary to the moral authority of advance directives because the sense 
of identity is vital to the notion of an advance directive altogether. It is very well and good if one 
would like to judge the consistency of an individual by biology or psychology—though it really 
isn’t, as I will address in my rebuttal to Furberg’s second objection—but without a sense of 
identity, the impetus for an advance directive is moot. 
As we will argue soon, identity is tied crucially to one’s critical interests. These interests 
are at the root of the decision for an advance directive. It goes without saying that identity, the 
sense of who we are, is grounded in our individual consciousness as well as our specific sets of 
values and interests. Without them, we would be superfluous beings, conscious but without 
agency. Of consciousness, identity, and narratives, Julian Jaynes states, “In consciousness, we are 
always seeing our vicarial selves as the main figures in the stories of our lives. …[S]ituations are 
chosen which are congruent to this ongoing story, until the picture I have of myself in my life story 
determines how I am to act and choose in novel situations as they arise.”51 We are all metaphors 
to ourselves and others, by his account. 
By my own account, we may extend this to Furberg’s psychological view of identity. While 
it is, again, well and good if one chooses to have a scientific notion of self, insofar as you, the 
 




individual with an identity, perceive the matter empirically, your unique consciousness is the 
arbiter of those autonomous decisions to be made utilizing the hardware you describe, and which 
is only substantial insofar as you perceive it. I say this because even with the psychological in 
mind, one’s identity persists as a sum of these disparate parts, and is the thrust of the autonomous 
decision-making, regardless of what scientific mechanisms compose the whole “I” and “you.” 
Secondly, I would argue that the psychological argument is flimsier than the narrative-
based concept of identity which Furberg refers to as normative. Psychology, if it is not identity-
based, is neurological. If it is neurological, it is biological. And biology is quite variable. At the 
most basic level, our cells, tissues, organelles, organs, organ systems, and full bodies are 
reconstructed on a daily basis; even our DNA changes, what with mutations, differing regional 
proteins, and epigenetics. Biological consistency is an oxymoron. 
Indeed, while the narrative identity argument presents concerns of changes over time, it is 
at least more plausible than psychological continuity in the absence of identity. If Furberg is saying 
that a lack of psychological continuity constitutes a shift between Person 1 and Person 2—again, 
in the absence of any form of identity—then think of prisoners on death row. It is not as if they are 
released every seven years, when their neural cells have been completely replaced. They are the 
same person because of a consistent identification that transcends these empirical changes. I am 
not attempting to strawman Furberg—I understand that neurology and psychology are distinct. 
What I am doing is pointing out that without some conceptions of values, interests, and/or identity, 
this notion of psychology as a standard alone just bottoms out in neurological changes. Strawman, 
no. Reductio ad absurdum? In essence. 
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Going along with this, if we tried to make an argument for ADE from brain structure, we 
only push the question back, and fall into the same hole—one’s DNA mutates every day, and 
neurons are constantly dying. 
While I can envision an effective argument on behalf of the consistency of psychology, it 
is certainly not the argument Furberg makes, because that effective psychological argument 
necessitates some form of identity, values, and critical interests. 
Finally, to rebut Furberg’s last objection, we need only to say this: kin do not automatically 
have authority over one’s wellbeing. Furberg offers little support for her point, but taking her 
objection seriously, we cannot favor the advance directive of Margo 1 on the basis of her 
resemblance to a relative. If Furberg were to argue from Margo 1’s interests or claims to Margo 
2’s wellbeing and body, this would be a different argument; however, arguing solely on the basis 
of Margo 1 being like Margo 2’s family member fails to prove that Margo 1 has the power to kill 
Margo 2. Surely, we can all think of relatives who make poor decisions on behalf of loved ones. 
Even if we are in favor of the advance directive, we cannot accept Furberg’s reasoning. 
This is not to say Furberg’s reasoning is unusual. Notions of familial inclusion in end-of-
life decision-making are often associated with “social death.” Borgstrom describes the death of 
one’s social relationships as a valid theory of death of identity. One’s relationships, her analysis 
posits, constitute the summation of one’s being; and so not only does this confer moral significance 
to socialization, but it indicates that loved ones should be consulted before the ending of one’s 
physical life.52 
 




I am not sure if I agree with this. It is more in line with our argumentation to place the 
autonomy of the individual above all else. However, this sort of reasoning does raise new 
considerations—if a person believes they are best represented by their family, there is no reason 
why their autonomous decision should not be to include their family in the ADE process, or, 
furthermore, to allow their family to delineate the conditions under which they should be 
euthanized. Even so, it is overly complex. We may as well grant these family members power of 
attorney, designate them living wills, or otherwise vest decision-making powers in their hands. To 
that end, social death theory seems discordant with the principle of autonomy undergirding our 
defense of ADE. 
These rebuttals in mind, we must acknowledge that biology and psychology can play into 
and work with notions of narrative identity and therefore of self, and all the rights that follow. They 
are interconnected, as Paul Thagard posits.53 He presents the following diagram as a representation 
of the “self”: 
 





It is notable that the social, psychological, neural, and molecular are limited to influencing one 
another, with a unique link between the social and molecular. All of these levels contribute to the 
overall unified narrative of one’s singular identity. 
The upshot of this conversation about identity and self is that an individual has narrative 
identity and unity which is indeed disrupted with the onset of dementia. However, her body, insofar 
as she is a physical being, persists, with interests that persevere beyond the disruption of her 
narrative unity. In other words, the non-demented person must use the advance directive to plan 
for the preservation of her dignity and interests after she is demented, Dworkin asserts.54 
This idea of a leftover body, living remains, leads us to the next core question of identity: 
personhood. If the pre-diagnosis individual is distinct from the post-diagnosis individual, does this 
post-diagnosis individual have personhood status? What is left in the body Margo 1 had always 
known, and does it now have the power to govern her body, her resources, her relationships? 
On the topic, Dena Davis frets: 
“[The] person I will become if I become demented will be someone radically different 
from my present self, so different that there is no justification for taking my present wishes as 
dispositive for making decisions for this demented self. …Legally, this new being will have a 
very odd relationship to my former self. She will be me in that she will retain my name and other 
identifiers and will be able to use up my assets; my spouse will not be free to remarry; but she 
legally will not be me when it comes to honoring advance directives. …Socially, our relationship 
is equally odd. Former friends and relatives will think of that person as me, and may persist in 
visiting her or contributing financial support, despite the fact that she does not know them. But 
they will not think of her as me when it comes time to make decisions, because they will not 
honor my advance directive.”55 
 
54 Dworkin, Ronald. Life's Dominion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom. New 
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If the situation seems grim, that’s because it is. She adds: 
“For the autonomy-oriented person…a diagnosis of impending dementia is a warning that 
one is about to be invaded by an enemy alien that will always win. It is thus entirely sensible to 
burn down the fort and refuse it a home.”56 
 
Unabashedly, we posit that Margo 2 does not have personhood. We align with Kuhse’s 
argumentation that the incompetent patient in Margo 2’s position is not a person57, due to lost 
rationality, agency, and self-consciousness. These are our standards of personhood, and Margo 2, 
unlike Margo 1, does not embody them. She may be a being with lesser-order claims, but, as we 
will argue in Section B, these cannot hold a candle to Margo 1’s claims.  
Our view of personhood synthesizes Kuhse’s standard of rationality, agency, and self-
consciousness with Ott’s analysis of Margo 1’s body as devoid of personhood after the death of 
her narrative identity and “mental person.”58 Ott raises substantial concerns over Margo 1’s claim 
over her physical body after it loses personhood, and on this matter we subsume Kuhse’s argument 
that painless execution of the advance directive is not morally problematic, because, as discussed 
in the previous chapter, the late compos mentis person’s surviving interests thwart the fleeting 
desires of a nonperson.59 
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In the following section, we will defend Margo 1’s claim to her body, incorporate 
Dworkinian critical interests into the framework of Margo’s claims, and show that the thwarting 
of these interests constitute harm beyond her narrative grave. 
Section B: The Bodily Autonomy of Margo 1, Posthumous Harm, and Critical Interests 
In “Authority without identity: defending advance directives via posthumous rights over 
one’s body,” Govind Persad argues that Margo 1 retains the ability to govern her body even though 
Margo 2 inhabits it.60 We align with this philosophy. 
Persad points to the emphasis on posthumous rights over one’s property, which are, he 
says, strongest in the case of one’s body, as it is the vessel through which we live our lives. In 
other words, though Margo 1 is dead, her having lived her life in this body is enough to constitute 
a significant claim to its wellbeing. 
He admits, “[A]lthough it may be wrenching to deny an individual who is currently 
embodied in a body the use of that body when she needs it to remain alive, [her death] can be 
morally justified when another person has a prior right to the body.”61 Prior rights, he says, are 
established through a history of use. He gives the example of a woman who authors an advance 
directive requesting that life support not be administered in the event of her brain death, even if 
she is pregnant; and when this woman is injured and pronounced brain dead, she is pregnant and 
not far along enough for the fetus to be viable without her. The theoretical asks whether it is wrong 
to administer life support for the sake of the gestating fetus. Persad maintains that it is wrong to 
 
60 Persad G. Authority without identity: defending advance directives via posthumous rights over one’s body. 
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defy the conditions of her advance directive, especially because she provided conditions for this 
scenario; insofar as her body is her most intimate property, tied to interests existing beyond her 
lifetime, she has established historical rights over how it is treated even in her death.62 
We may apply this to Margo, in claiming that Margo 1 maintains historical rights over the 
treatment of her body, regardless of whether it harms Margo 2, who is in a sense an unwelcome 
guest—I would say even more so than the fetus in Persad’s example, given Margo 1 did not 
willingly opt for Margo 2 to exist, and in fact went to great lengths to limit her access to their 
mutual body. 
Sandra Woien argues that in the case of conflicting bodily rights in the case of a pre- and 
post-diagnosis patient, there exists now-for-then preferences (made by the writers of the advance 
directives) and now-for-now preferences (which live within the individuals currently inhabiting 
the post-diagnosis body).63 She criticizes those who argue now-for-now preferences are superior 
in the strength felt by Margo 2, and echoes Dworkin in saying, “[It] is doubtful that [dementia 
patient’s] current preferences are consistent with their critical interests such as their life plans and 
their deep values that they were still mindful of when filling out [the advance directive].”64 
As these critical interests are cogent to the individual’s true wants and first-order desires, 
the patient’s cognizance when completing the advance directive is morally significant. It is the 
individual’s true desire. Woien concludes, “As in the case of Ulysses, who told his crew to 
disregard his pleas to be released on hearing the enticing cries of the sirens, both precedent 
autonomy and welfare beckon us to disregard their present desires, and since their now-for-then 
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desire, as explicitly stated in their AED65, is more informed than their present desire to live, we 
have a strong reason to honor it.”66 
Core to this discussion is the notion of historical bodily autonomy as a legitimate critical 
interest. If Margo 1 is writing an advance directive, historical bodily rights are necessarily tied to 
her critical interests, because her right to govern her body is a part of her life’s central narrative. 
Surely, she cared about those rights enough to assert them—and to respect her critical interests, 
respecting her ADE must follow. 
As previously stated, though we disagree with Dworkin’s view of narrative unity 
throughout dementia, we agree that critical interests are the binding goals and desires granting 
coherence to one’s story, as stated in Life’s Dominion.67 We reiterate the Dworkinian view that the 
method of one’s bodily death is a necessary critical interest of one’s life, as opposed to shallow 
experiential interests (the only thing Margo 2 can experience). We choose to synthesize this key 
aspect of the Dworkinian perspective on the ADE, because other than the splintering of identity, 
we concur with his philosophical framework. We would even point to the verbiage Dworkin 
uses—he claims Margo has merely lost the ability to understand anything beyond her experiential 
interests68—to posit that the loss of critical interests he himself describes equals the death of 
identity, as we have defined it. Thus, using his description of what happens to Margo cognitively, 
we argue that she has in effect died. Our main contention with Dworkin, then, is the definition of 
mental death and the death of identity. Everything else is cogent. Thus, we choose to subsume his 
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notion of the critical interest, to argue that Margo 1’s interests are critical, while Margo 2’s are 
not. 
Because Margo 1’s interests have significant moral weight in the context of her life, and 
because Margo 1 is a being of higher rational order and personhood, Margo 1’s interests must win 
out against Margo 2’s. If a medical professional would choose to disrespect Margo 1’s critical 
interest of historical bodily rights, then he violates one of the four principles of bioethics: 
autonomy. 
(He also posthumously harms her. We will begin by discussing autonomy, for the purpose 
of explicating its infringement in this scenario, and then end with a discussion of posthumous 
harm.) On autonomy: 
Beauchamp and Childress’ four principles of bioethics—autonomy, justice, beneficence, 
and non-maleficence69—are core in this case, as it concerns medical practice. The four principles 
of medical ethics are used by medical professionals, bioethicists, and legislators as a general, 
typically nonbinding brightline by which to evaluate field cases. They are grounded in the 
elevation of the patient and the affected stakeholders, such that beneficence is maximized, harm is 
avoided, negative externalities are minimized, fairness and justice are upheld, and, perhaps most 
essentially in this case, the autonomy of the patient is prioritized. Insofar as the philosophical 
aspects of this case are arguable, bioethicists might disagree on the doctors’ fulfillments of the four 
principles. For Margo 1, we would posit that it is not only morally permissible and praiseworthy 
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to respect her advance directive, but morally obligatory. It is most expedient to represent this with 
the potential for doctors’ violations of her bodily autonomy. 
Of the four principles applicable to this case, autonomy is the most noticeably applicable. 
More specifically, if the doctors were to ignore Margo’s advance directive, her autonomy would 
be jeopardized. The autonomy at stake is not just bodily autonomy. It is the very autonomy to 
govern her life’s story—to fulfill her critical interests. Additionally, Margo 1’s body is historically 
hers, but also legally, socially, and financially hers, in the sense that the accumulation of her life’s 
choices is tied to her corporeal form. That body is, in a sense, her living remains, and Margo 2 is 
a being unlike her, who has moved in to enjoy the most basic sensory pleasures that Margo 1’s 
body can still process. If Margo 1 anticipated this visitor while compos mentis and explicitly stated 
that she would like Margo 2 evicted (via an ADE), then because it is Margo 1’s body in that 
moment, it is in within her rights to anticipate how it will be treated in the future. If in the future, 
a doctor does not respect this, then he violates Margo 1’s autonomy, posthumously harming her. 
In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls states that “acting autonomously is acting from 
principles that we would consent to as free and equal rational beings…. Also, these principles are 
objective. They are principles that we would want everyone (including ourselves) to follow….”70 
Significantly, the patient’s autonomous decree in favor of her interests—which are in dementia 
patients commonly related to quality of life, freedom from suffering, and dignity—is an objective 
assessment in favor of what is for her most beneficial and/or most beneficial to those whose 
interests are equivalent or primary to her own. 
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Ronald Dworkin combats the evidentiary substantiation for a right to autonomy71 which 
Rawls seems to suggest—evidentiary, as in, the view that objective factors affecting the 
individual’s self-interests are best weighed by the individual, who should know her interests best. 
By presenting counterexamples of self-destructive behaviors, Dworkin shows that the evidentiary 
view is not always tried and true. On the contrary, he proposes a view based in integrity. He states 
that an individual’s behaviors exemplify her character, such that she may act autonomously in 
promotion of interests to fulfill her character. In other words, an individual may rush into a burning 
building not for her own best interest, but because she wants to save a child, a decision consistent 
with her character. This I mention because autonomy is at the fore of the advance directive for 
euthanasia; the person signing the document has autonomy, whereas the non-compos mentis 
person being euthanized does not. 
It is not a matter of acting in one’s best interest but rather a matter of supporting the 
integrity of the autonomous being. Dworkin argues: “[I]f we accept the integrity view, we will be 
drawn to the view that Margo’s past wishes must be respected. A competent person making a 
living will providing for his treatment if he becomes demented is making exactly the kind of 
judgment that autonomy, on the integrity view, most respects: a judgment about the overall shape 
of the kind of life he wants to have led.”72 
The expression of this autonomy is necessarily tied to the critical interest of historical 
bodily autonomy, as described by Persad. 
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In this case, when we enhance autonomy, the other three principles of bioethics 
(beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice) follow. Yet if someone does not respect Margo 1’s 
advance directive, he does not act in a beneficent manner, because he harms the compos mentis 
patient for a non-compos mentis, non-person patient’s momentary beneficence. Due to Margo 2’s 
lack of ability to understand the future, it is a beneficence without lasting moral weight—a 
temporary beneficence immediately and severely outweighed by the maleficence toward Margo 1, 
whose dignity, agency, and choice are dashed in a most unjust manner. The injustice is 
compounded by the effects on Margo’s loved ones who know her wishes are not respected, and 
who know she would not have wanted her body to be treated in an uncharacteristic, undignified 
manner. Additionally, this will deter potential writers of advance directives, who anticipate their 
wishes will also be disrespected. In turn, they will die in manners similar to Margo, with living 
remains, whose painful and disgraceful declines are contrary to the ends the patients would have 
desired if they had been afforded narrative agency. We are then led to understand that the harms 
of disrespecting an advance directive are exponential. 
And in that scenario, despite Margo 1’s death, the immediate harms would be very real. 
Now, one might be eager to disregard posthumous harm with Epicurean notions of death. 
However, practically, legally, and ethically, it is difficult to be ambivalent toward one’s demise. 
For example, estate planning, wills, and, indeed, advance directives are institutions of society 
which exemplify a very human desire to control our interests beyond our own demises. 
Even so, these institutions are legal in nature. Many would wonder if there are moral claims 
to be had after death in the same manner that one would tarry over the division of one’s assets. As 
applicable to the case of Margo, these moral claims would be over one’s body after the death of 
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the identity. Insofar as Margo’s narrative unity has been divided as Margo 1 has “died,” does 
Margo 1 still have moral authority, and therefore can she be harmed by the refusal to heed her 
historical rights? I will of course argue yes on both accounts. 
Once the notion of the death of Margo 1’s identity has been accepted, the argument for the 
advanced euthanasia directive on the basis of posthumous harm is fairly straightforward. Simply 
put, if Margo 1 has historical rights to her body as established by Persad, and if these are not 
heeded after the death of her identity, then this constitutes harm to her worldly interests. 
Furthermore, it constitutes an infringement upon her autonomy—she, after all, still possesses the 
integrity and objective first-order interests which compel our heeding her preferences. As Woien 
stated, these do not merely dissipate after one’s death. So to ignore these rights is to do harm unto 
Margo 1, as strongly as one would have harmed her while alive. The latter is evident by the mere 
fact that there was no way to infringe upon her historical bodily rights in such a manner until after 
her death. Therefore the magnitude of the infringement upon these rights exist in their fullest 
capacity. 
In volume one of The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Harm to Others, Joel Feinberg 
delineates three types of harm: harm in the derivative sense, the thwarting of one’s interest, and, 
lastly, the infringement upon one’s rights.73 Feinberg dismisses the first on the basis of 
shallowness, to emphasize the latter two, and this is just as well, as we will follow suit. Under 
Feinberg’s definition of harm, Margo 1’s interests have been thwarted and her rights have been 
infringed upon. Namely, her interest to end her life in a manner cogent with the rest of its narrative 
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integrity (a bad last chapter makes a bad book, as the analogy goes), and her historical rights over 
the welfare of her body, based on precedent and the lifelong ownership of herself as property. 
Feinberg’s account of posthumous harm acknowledges the Epicurean logic, but also 
acknowledges that death is a great thwarting of interests and therefore qualifies as inflicting 
harm.74 Any healthy person in reasonable conditions, he argues, will dread death, and this is an 
expression of an innate notion of having been deprived of the benefits of continued life. Nagel 
agrees, stating, “Clearly if death is an evil at all, it cannot be because of its positive features, but 
only because of what it deprives us of.”75 ‘What it deprives us of’ is the fulfillment of our interest, 
at most basic the interest to keep living and more potently the interests which uphold our respective 
narrative integrities. I, for example, want to write a book; other people want to have children; and 
yet others simply want to keep living happily with their families. Death is harmful to us in that 
capacity. And if death can be harmful to an entity which no longer exists—as it must be, because 
its existence immediately entails the termination of one’s own existence—then by temporal 
extension, it is not farfetched to say that the further thwarting of that dead entity’s interests can be 
harmful. In other words, if death itself is harmful, and one cannot be harmed by death until one is 
already dead, then the chronological floodgates have opened—one may be harmed after the event 
of death as well. 
Of course, there is the issue of backwards causation. George Pitcher, a proponent of the 
notion of posthumous harm, admits that a common objection is temporal confusion, as in, a lack 
of conceptualization of how one can be harmed by events after death while one is still alive. He 
 
74 Feinberg, Joel. The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law Volume 1: Harm to Others. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1987. Print. 
75 Nagel, Thomas (1970). Death. Noûs 4 (1):73-80. 
52 
 
argues that such an objection is flawed because it falsely assumes that a harm must result in some 
change in one’s metaphysical being. To illustrate this, he tells the story of man whose son is killed 
in an airplane crash, unbeknownst to the man, who tragically dies before he can be notified of his 
son’s demise. If his son’s welfare is one of his strongest interests, then his interests have been 
thwarted even before he knows; and if his son’s death occurs after his own, his interests have been 
thwarted regardless.76 
Steven Luper elaborates on Pitcher’s account. He states, “On Pitcher's view, posthumous 
events can only be indirect harms. …[Direct] harms are certain facts about us that come to hold by 
virtue of the posthumous events that occur much later. …Partly because of these [indirect 
posthumous] events, ‘certain desires of ours will be thwarted, certain goods unattained’ is true of 
us, and its being true of us is the direct harm for which the corresponding posthumous events are 
responsible.”77 In other words, while posthumous harm exists, it is not the direct punch-in-the-face 
sort of thwarting of interests that someone might think if they were to read Feinberg’s notion of 
harms. Luper goes on to claim that posthumous events can harm an individual without changing 
our intrinsic properties; an event that will tangibly harm us tomorrow by proxy harms us now, 
insofar as our present interest is thwarted (our present interest being to live unharmed tomorrow). 
Because our present interest is as a matter of fact going to be harmed, our wellbeing today is 
damaged, as our interest exists in the present. 
To reframe this in the context of our argumentation, if Margo 1 authors an advance 
directive today requesting physician-assisted euthanasia once she is non-compos mentis, and if as 
a matter of truth the physician will (in the future) deny her the euthanasia, then her present interests 
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are thwarted. Her interests could be to maintain dignity, to live fully and not as a shell of herself, 
to not burden her family members, or any other number of factors personal to her, and significant 
insofar as they are expressions of her autonomy. The crux of the matter is that they will only be 
upheld if she is given physician-assisted euthanasia as written in the advance directive. If the 
euthanasia is denied her in the future, after the death of Margo 1, her present interests as living 
Margo 1 are thwarted. 
Because she, Margo 1, bears historical and precedent-based bodily rights, the potential 
prioritization of Margo 2, who bears no legal standing and significantly reduced moral standing, 
will constitute harm to Margo 1 even after her death. And insofar as she will be harmed after her 
death, Margo 1 is harmed now. 
The purpose of this argumentation has been to establish a moralistic foundation for the 
utilization of advance directives for physician-assisted euthanasia. All of this said, we are then 
faced with the practical dilemma of having doctors follow through with the euthanasia procedure. 
Posthumous harm or not, it is difficult to look into the eyes of a smiling Margo and tell her that 
she is going to die against her will. Margo 2 is a reduced being, yes, but in practice, killing her is 




Chapter V. Practicalities, Considerations, and Reservations 
Or so one would think. In actuality, a primary concern of the ADE is not the reluctance of 
medical professionals to comply with procedure, but rather their willingness. In countries that have 
implemented euthanasia, public health officials criticize its dangerous normalization and 
routinization, as seen in the case of Dr. Fenigsen. 
Fenigsen, who originates from and practices in the Netherlands, laments the zealous use of 
euthanasia in light of negligence and normalization of euthanasia.78 He describes the case of a 
fourteen-year-old child who was about to be euthanized before his intervention. The child was 
unconscious, but doctors did not spend much time trying to revive her before resorting to 
euthanasia. If Fenigsen had not intervened, the child would have died. She was revived hours later. 
Other concerns include the fear that if euthanasia is normalized with the ADE, there will 
be discrimination against the disabled, in the form of pressure to pursue euthanasia79; that while 
doctors generally do support euthanasia, it will be difficult to extricate death from maleficence in 
their minds, causing psychological harm to medical professionals80; and that there will be 
inequalities in access to the mechanisms necessary for ethical practice of ADE. 
Interestingly, public support is not a concern. Although religion is a major impeding factor 
in people’s willingness to accept euthanasia, the public overwhelmingly supports euthanasia. In 
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fact, euthanasia is more publicly favored than physician-assisted suicide, yet euthanasia remains 
illegal.81 
Before we address the listed concerns, there is a conversation to be had here concerning 
killing versus letting die. We could of course reference the classic hypotheticals of drowning one’s 
cousin versus not saving one’s already-drowning cousin. However, such a discussion haphazardly 
assumes that to fulfill a patient’s autonomous request for physician-assisted euthanasia is to take 
a primarily active role in the death. I would posit that ADE is actually more morally akin to letting 
die, given that the physician has taken an oath of beneficence and non-maleficence, and is bound 
in their duty to do right by the patient in the manner she delineates, as an autonomous being. 
(As an aside, I will also preemptively rebut the potential objection that some “autonomous” 
patients desire procedures which are inherently damaging, and that therefore an ADE falls within 
the self-harming realm of, for example, a patient with dysmorphia who may feel “overcomplete” 
and desire to lose healthy limbs. These dysmorphias result out of abnormalities in the parietal lobe, 
and for the purposes of this discussion on practicalities, I will simply say that such cases are not 
analogous to ours, as they do not constitute the same moral, biological, or legal stakes. Dementia 
involves a loss of identity and the mitigation of future harms, whereas the case of someone with 
parietal body dysmorphia would typically be more concerned with the treatment of mental illness.) 
The aforementioned concerns of discrimination, normalization, and psychological harms 
in ADE can be addressed with the assembly of a well-focused team of caseworkers, bioethicists, 
physicians, psychologists, counselors, lawyers, and family members (if the patient desires her 
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family to be present, in respect of her autonomy). This task force must advise and aid the patient, 
while compos mentis and while non-compos mentis. Only with their input, mediation, and 
enthusiastic support can the advance directive complete its protection of the patient’s most critical 
interests. 
Preventing abuses, though, begins with one of the most problematic aspects of the advance 
directive, which is writing it. The patient, with the advice of her medical institution’s ADE team, 
must be able to designate the brightline past which her mind will no longer be sound. 
The designation of one’s mind as sound versus unsound is an extremely sensitive subject, 
and a huge practical hurdle. Traditionally, rationality is determined by age and medically-
designated status of mental wellness; however, when dealing with mental regression (such as 
dementia) rather than maturation (such as coming of voting age), the line of rationality is not so 
clear. In fact, it is less a brightline and more a gray zone. The ethicist is faced with a conundrum, 
as if we were to designate the conditions for one’s rationality, we would struggle to find criteria 
applicable to every patient. Yet if we allow each patient to designate what constitutes a loss of 
rationality, we are in danger of the patient making the standards too difficult or too lenient. If the 
test of rationality is too difficult, then the patient lives with the harms she intended to avoid by 
penning the advance directive. If the test of rationality is too lenient, then the patient will be fully 
cognizant of her situation and prematurely sent to death despite her own protests—a truly chilling 
scenario. 
It is therefore important to take a mediated approach. Because the government cannot 
designate a single test of one’s faculties for every patient—some people, for example, struggle to 
remember birthdays even while fully rational; and some demented people can remember birthdays 
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but cannot remember their own names—it must be the patient’s duty to write the conditions for 
qualifying as non-compos mentis. The patient must, however, be advised in her decision by 
ethicists, social workers, lawyers, psychologists, counselors, and doctors. I would also argue that 
the patient’s test of rationality cannot be a mere one, two, or three question test, as there is great 
potential for error with so few determining factors. Someone who fails a test about the date of their 
birth may still be able to live a fulfilled life, at least for a small while longer. The purpose of the 
advance directive for euthanasia is to prolong fulfilled living as much as possible. Thus, it is in the 
spirit of the advance directive for euthanasia to have the patient designate a long series of 
questions—ideally twenty to thirty—with great personal magnitude, before the medical 
professional can deem her compos mentis or non-compos mentis. These questions should revolve 
around the persistence or loss of one’s critical interests. Insofar as one’s critical interests define 
one’s self, their disappearance connotes a loss of identity, as occurs with the severe onset of 
dementia. 
This is an imperfect answer. Hence, it is a major reservation of the implementation of the 
ADE. We will not pretend to have all the answers. Rather, we intend to open the dialogue for 
further questions. 
What of the concerns regarding doctors, nurses, and other medical staff? How do we 
prevent potential abuses as well as psychological harms as a result of having to defy their ethical 
inclinations? 
Let us also note that the political and religious culture of the Netherlands is distinct from 
the United States, and we would likely face resistance from medical practitioners far before 
normalization became a real concern. Changing the hearts and minds of doctors to accept and 
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respect the ADE as typical practice may seem a difficult first step. Nevertheless, I assert that it is 
a moral obligation for the doctor to respect the advance directive. While it may be difficult to look 
a seemingly happy person in the eye and euthanize them, it is the doctor’s duty to remember that 
this is not the real person to whom the body belongs. The real person gave explicit and detailed 
consent to die. To refuse the author her dignified death is malpractice, a violation of every one of 
the four bioethical principles. The author signed the advance directive trusting that a medical 
professional would fulfill it. It is not within the doctor’s jurisdiction to act paternalistically. It is 
only within the doctor’s jurisdiction to uphold the best interests of the patient. 
However, a doctor may still refuse. I would draw a parallel to the case of abortions—on 
ideological, personal, or religious grounds, a doctor may refuse to carry out a procedure resulting 
in the termination of a pregnancy. While I do believe this is malpractice, I live in the real world, 
and understand that not every doctor is going to be willing to check her moral baggage at the door. 
Thus, I would argue that it is permissible for the doctor to refrain from the abortive procedure; and 
I would argue the same for euthanasia. But this renders it morally obligatory, without exception, 
for the hospital or clinic to have another medical professional euthanize the advance directive’s 
author. I conjecture that with the dissemination of new ethical standards for euthanasia, doctors 
will fall into line with less resistance than expected. Over millennia of medical practice, doctors 
change their practices according to what is acceptable in medical lessons and literature. One need 
only to look to the normalization of euthanasia in the Netherlands to see that with increasing social 
and academic normality, euthanasia will lose its abrasiveness in medical culture. 
Because of this, we must educate doctors about the nuances of the euthanasia advance 
directive. If the doctor is determined to ignore the advance directive, then hospital caseworkers 
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and ethicists must interfere with this malpractice. If the doctor is too casual with her administration 
of euthanasia, then hospital caseworkers and ethicists must interfere with this malpractice as well. 
The last enormous issue we have not yet addressed is a matter of access and distributive 
justice. In order to ethically implement the ADE, a patient would need a sizeable task force in a 
sizeable medical institution with sizeable resources. This is not viable for everyone. To have an 
ethical ADE, it seems, one needs to be affluent in an affluent region. This is an emblem of the 
flaws of the American healthcare system, but we cannot have “fix the healthcare system” as a tenet 
of this paper. We must acknowledge this practical barrier. 
Furthermore, there may be an access issue when it comes to communicating with this team. 
Some people are illiterate; some people may struggle with working with this team to define their 
brightline of rational faculties; and some people may not fully comprehend the complexities of it 
all, not because they are demented, but because it is a difficult thing for most of the population to 
understand. 
Once more, these are reservations. We cannot pretend to be omniscient or omnipotent. But 
we can identify these issues and seek the changes necessary to rectify them. We conclude this 
report with the knowledge that a conclusion has not yet been reached—or, at least, in a manner 
that is satisfactory and convincing beyond a doubt. 
While this exploration of Margo’s dilemma by no means solves its practical entanglements, 
it provides groundwork for more definitive suggestions as to how the medical community should 
approach advance directives for euthanasia. Moreover, we definitely argue that the ADE is 
imperative for the wellbeing of the American people, who will with its implementation enjoy so 
many more compos mentis years of life; the prevention of undue suffering; and the fulfilment of 
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their critical interests to bodily autonomy. With the ADE, one would only hope that there would 
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